To try and better understand the Middle East, it helps to take in a broader perspective of the situation -- to step back and examine the problem with some distance.

Conflict-resolution theorists call this the "helicopter perspective." This is when a certain distance is required to better understand a conflict; this process, in theory, allows conflict interveners to "hover" above a specific area, taking in an overall view of the problem at hand, and then "zoom in" and focus on particular details as needed.

Applying the same theory to time, rather than space, would offer a clearer view of just how much more complicated the Middle East keeps getting with each passing year. In other words, step back in time and look at the same problem at different intervals. What one will discover is that the crisis keeps getting amplified with each passing year.

The starting point in the Israeli-Arab dispute could be set at any point in the calendar, but for the sake of simplicity let's start in June 1967 just prior to the Six-Day War and analyze the principal stakeholders. Now hover over the same crisis jumping ahead in 10-year increments.

This will demonstrate that the longer the Middle East crisis is left unresolved, the more complicated it becomes and the more violent it gets.

On the eve of the June 5, 1967, Arab-Israeli war there was no Palestinian resistance to speak of. Although initially founded in 1964, it was only after the humiliating defeat of the 1967 war that the PLO became more active militarily through the formation of various fedayeen groups. Had peace been attempted then, one of the principal players would have been Egypt, led at the time by Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose prestige carried enough weight throughout the Arab world that any decision reached by the "Rais" would greatly influence the rest of the Arab world. It was not to be so.

The next decade (1967-1977) saw the growth of the Palestinian resistance and its interference in domestic affairs in Jordan and Lebanon, in both instances culminating in devastating civil wars: Jordan in 1970 and Lebanon in 1975. Had attempts at peacemaking been seriously made, the principal players would have included Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO and leader of Fatah, the largest of the Palestinian militias.

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who succeeded Nasser, lacked the authority of his predecessor, and Egypt could no longer speak for the Arab world. A peace conference at this point would have required the presence of Syria and the PLO. However, at this point in time Washington refused to acknowledge the PLO or engage it in negotiations. U.S. diplomats overseas were banned from talking to Palestinian representatives.

The situation in the Middle East becomes even more complicated over the next 10 years (1977-1987). The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 triggers the formation of the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, which becomes a major player in the conflict. Continuous harassment by the Shiite militia -- now openly backed by Iran and Syria -- of Israeli troops occupying Lebanon eventually forces the Jewish state to pull its troops back across the border. This, in essence, gives the Arabs their first real victory in the conflict since 1948.

That same invasion, masterminded by Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, was meant to distance the PLO from Israel's frontiers by evicting them from Lebanon and relocating them to Arab countries that did not share a border with Israel. The PLO was forced to relocate -- temporarily -- in Tunisia, and its fighters dispersed as far away as Morocco, Algeria and Yemen. This forced exile did not last long as the fedayeen gradually made their way back to Lebanon and Syria. Despite the distance from Israel's borders, the PLO leadership in Tunis succeeded in financing the first intifada in the occupied territories. Israeli attacks and attempts to decapitate the PLO leadership in Tunis did not stop the popular uprising, the end result of which was the attempted peace conference in Madrid and the "return" of the PLO leadership to the Palestinian territories. In retrospect, Sharon's initial plan to distance the PLO ended up bringing it right into Israel's back yard -- and its front yard as well.

The complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute grows further during the next 10 years (1987-1997) with the founding of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, composed of elements closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The creation of Hamas was at first encouraged by the Israeli intelligence community, which believed Hamas could counterbalance Fatah. In that they were correct, but the miscalculation was that in the long run Hamas would prove to be a far more threatening enemy than Fatah. Still, at that time Arafat commanded enough clout among Palestinians to be able to impose terms of a peace agreement, had one been reached. But Palestinian negotiators involved in the Camp David and the Wye River attempts at peacemaking maintain that what was offered to Arafat was unacceptable, giving the Palestinians a non-contiguous state.

Fast-forward past the next decade to the present time (1997-2008) and examine the conflict using the helicopter perspective mentioned above. Consider the new elements that come into play today that were not present in yesteryears; Hamas in the Palestinian territories; Hezbollah in Lebanon; a Syria that is rearming and stronger than it was in the previous decades; al-Qaida and its affiliates around the world; and last but by no means least, the growing influence of Iran and its mullahs in the Middle East.

A good question to ask at this point is: Can the world wait another decade that, if history is any indication, only promises to be even more complex and violent?

Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.

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