"I think that if there had not been Russian air forces, then yes, we had a chance," he says as he shifts his body by grabbing a steel bar running above his bed.

Like others recovering in the Georgian capital after their army's failed offensive in South Ossetia last week, he sees Russian air power as the key factor.

Many recounted terrifying ordeals under aerial bombardment around the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, where fighting was concentrated and many fellow soldiers were said to have been lost.

"We couldn't handle it. The troops were very well prepared, but the air forces of Russia destroyed everything," 29-year-old Dato, a captain who declined to give his surname, told AFP as he lay covered in shrapnel injuries, his arm in a steel brace.

Russian planes including SU-25s bomber jets and MiGs had been in the area, he said, and like other soldiers he claimed cluster bombs had been used.

Maintaining an icy stare as he recalled his experiences, he was visibly moved when he talked of the mangled bodies left after a Russian plane attacked an area where the injured were being collected.

An official post-mortem on Georgia's military action in South Ossetia has not yet begun and it is unclear what the political consequences will be after the humiliating defeat and near destruction of Georgia's army.

Despite help from the world's biggest military power, the United States, and a sharp increase in defence spending in recent years under President Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian forces were no match for Russia's hugely superior firepower.

The US has spent millions on military training, equipment and weaponry for Georgia, which provided 2,000 troops for the US-led force in Iraq.

Levan Tsereteli, 20, a corporal, is another air raid victim found on the wards of Tbilisi's hospitals, where stories abound about planes swooping down to 30 metres (100 feet) from ground-level before unleashing a fearsome assault.

"The first time the plane missed, then suddenly we saw it again and it was shooting and dropping bombs. I was wounded from the shrapnel," he said, a heavy, blood-stained bandage visible around his thigh.

Giorgi Gvelesiahl, a 19-year-old corporal, recounts a similar tale as he sits on his bed, eyes downcast.

"I was wounded by a plane. It was a bomb I think, the shrapnel went in my shoulder and in my back," he says, turning slightly to show a bandage surrounded by scabs.

After being evacuated to a hospital in the nearby city of Gori, he now hopes to make a full recovery and return to the army, but admits to having lost some of his faith.

"It would be better if my friends were here who have died," he sighs. "Before going we were very proud, but now we are not so proud."

Vakhtang Maisaia, a military analyst and defence advisor to the Georgian government from 1999-2001, told AFP the country's leadership was unprepared for the Russian onslaught and had no answer to Moscow's air force.

"Russian air superiority was crucial. The Georgians were unable to cope with their air defense system," he said.

"Georgia had only tactical air defense (anti-aircraft guns, ground-to-air missiles) which was insufficient. For a short period the ground troops were being protected, but in the long-term it was not enough."

He said Russia had deployed SU-24 and SU-25 bombers, Soviet planes designed to support ground forces, to target infrastructure and troops, as well as TU-22 long-range strategic bombers.

"If we had had fighter jets, maybe the Russians would not have had such superiority," he said.

In response, Georgia could call on only 10-15 SU-25 bombers, some of which were destroyed and the rest were immobilised after Russia attacked Georgia's military airports, he said.

"Without a doubt, there was absolutely nothing we could do against them (the Russians) once the planes were sent in," says Temur Chachanidze, a former analyst at Georgia's defence ministry and a journalist at the bi-weekly Arsenal military magazine.

"Aviation played the main role. The soldiers told me that everything went wrong as soon as the planes moved in.

"The operation was well organised but the conception of our army, the type of weapons bought by our army and the type of priorties we had was not that well thought out.

"We concentrated on infantry and tanks, which are of no use if they don't have proper cover from the air."

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