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Examining Georgia With Hindsight Part Two

The five-day war exposed the Russian army's strong and weak points. Its strengths included a fast start, the methodical and consistent tactics it used to suppress Georgia's artillery and rear infrastructure, and a successful anti-sabotage operation. All that credits the high qualifications of Russian command and headquarters staff. As for its weaknesses, it failed to completely suppress Georgia's air defense units and air force. It also lacked cutting-edge equipment and used obsolete communications systems. Some of these faults were recognized by the military leaders. Three-star Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who was the army press spokesman during the conflict, admitted the loss of a Tupolev Tu-22MR jet due to imperfect combat training of the Russian air force.
by Ilya Kramnik
Moscow (UPI) Sep 23, 2008
It is important to remember that throughout the Russian army's Aug. 8-12 operations in Georgia, Russian forces were restricted by a series of political commitments that prevented them from using heavy weapons in populated areas and greatly limited their counter-fire activities.

Russian aircraft continued strikes on Georgia's military infrastructure until Aug. 12, making it impossible for its armed forces to carry on fighting.

Russia's navy also took part in the operation; a group of Black Sea Fleet warships patrolled the coasts of Abkhazia -- another Russian-supported secessionist region within Georgia -- and of Georgia. The group included the fleet's main ships, including the Moskva guided-missile cruiser, three frigates, two small submarine chasers, the small missile carrier Mirage, four guided-missile boats, a communications ship and a marines group including landing ships Saratov and Tsezar Kunikov, and a troop ship, General Ryabikov, which carried two marine battalions.

The marines eventually landed in Abkhazia, thus expanding the operation area. The reconnaissance units of the marines and the 7th Air Assault Division marched all the way to Poti and seized important Georgian military cargo and burned Georgian naval boats.

Much is unclear in this marine episode of the Russian-Georgian war. On Aug. 11 we heard the news that Russian warships had sunk a Georgian missile boat, the Tbilisi. Later it turned out that the Tbilisi had been burned in Poti by Russian marines. Since the remaining boats retreated to the Georgian port of Batumi, it was impossible to find out which of them was destroyed, if any, in the fight with the Russian navy. There are some reports that Georgia lost two ships.

By Aug. 11 the Georgian army was no longer an organized force, as the footage of its ignominious retreat from South Ossetia, Gori and other areas was shown around the globe. Its units fled south, mostly to Tbilisi, leaving their weaponry behind, while Russian forces along with Abkhazian and South Ossetian units carried the hostilities on to Georgia's own territory, seizing the abandoned equipment and destroying what remained of the country's military infrastructure.

On Aug. 12 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the completion of the operation.

The five-day war exposed the Russian army's strong and weak points. Its strengths included a fast start, the methodical and consistent tactics it used to suppress Georgia's artillery and rear infrastructure, and a successful anti-sabotage operation. All that credits the high qualifications of Russian command and headquarters staff.

As for its weaknesses, it failed to completely suppress Georgia's air defense units and air force. It also lacked cutting-edge equipment and used obsolete communications systems.

Some of these faults were recognized by the military leaders. Three-star Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who was the army press spokesman during the conflict, admitted the loss of a Tupolev Tu-22MR jet due to imperfect combat training of the Russian air force.

Casualties are estimated differently on both sides. Russia reported 71 killed, 19 missing and four aircraft shot down. It also said it lost several dozen combat machines, including 10 to 15 Main Battle Tanks.

(Ilya Kramnik is a military commentator for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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