Pushing Ukraine or Georgia into NATO in his remaining months in office is Bush's only chance at scoring a major success in Eastern Europe. This is why he was so determined to go there, ignoring Russia's objections and doubts of U.S. traditional European allies.

Bush is moving like a bulldozer in many directions. By the end of the year he needs to achieve results in the Middle East peace process. He has to feign stabilization in Iraq and consolidate uncertain success in Afghanistan, even if with Moscow's help.

NATO's expansion to the CIS is also in the same category.

His brief visit to Ukraine should be viewed in this context. No achievements were made in U.S.-Ukrainian economic contacts, but Bush reached his goal. His visit registered the U.S. agenda in the region and laid a stepping stone for his successor. Bush made it clear that Ukraine is an American ally (it takes part in all major U.S. military operations) and should be supported as such and given a chance to assert its independence and democracy.

This is the second time Washington has ignored Moscow's interests, apparently believing that it would be as easy with Ukraine as it was with Kosovo. It is ready to pay the second bill, but this time old Europe is unhappy. The United States will have to make up for the split in relations with Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy. They are obviously in favor of delaying the NATO entry issue, at least until Georgia normalizes its relations with its separatist enclaves. Needless to say, old Europe is asking the United States to listen to Moscow's opinion on Ukraine. Germany and France are voicing their special opinion, although their new leaders are obviously more pro-American than their predecessors.

They are ready for closer cooperation with the United States, but yet they refused the U.S. demand to open NATO doors in April.

Bush made it clear to the Ukrainian elite that they should not worry about NATO. If the question is not resolved this week, it will be settled by the end of the year, before his term ends, he reassured them. How realistic that is remains an open question.

Now let us consider the situation in Ukraine. Despite the complexity of Ukraine's NATO entry, there was no serious split in Ukrainian society. For all the exaggerations (Viktor Yushchenko said that 40 percent of Ukrainians want to join NATO), young people have a more neutral attitude on this issue than those who are over 30. This means that the majority of the population may vote for joining NATO at a referendum several years from now. But this is just speculation.

Neither the ruling coalition nor the respectable opposition staged demonstrations for or against NATO. The only anti-NATO action was organized by left-wing forces -- Pyotr Simonenko's Communists and Natalia Vitrenko's supporters backed by Alexander Moroz's Socialists. Bush's visit and Ukraine's possible NATO entry did not cause a political scandal in Kiev, which points to certain solidarity of a considerable part of the Party of Regions and the Orange forces on this issue.

But will this remove the threat of Ukraine's geopolitical split? After all, Crimea has a special position on this issue. One more question is why Ukraine cannot stay away from all blocs or just be on their border? NATO leaders believe that now that the Cold War is over, and Russia and NATO do not oppose each other, there is no need for a buffer zone in Europe.

To follow this logic, NATO can be wherever it wants, while Russia should be where it is and should not worry; NATO is its friend, and its interests coincide with Russia's -- it is only that Moscow is not yet aware of this.

In the meantime, Ukraine is ready and is aware of everything. This problem is rooted in Russia's weak policy during the entire post-Soviet period. Moscow was unable to offer Kiev a reasonable alternative, and perhaps there was none. In any event, Ukraine is ready to play the role offered to it by the United States in this region of Eastern Europe and the CIS, and this role inspires Kiev more than the Moscow scenario. This role means more independence, and more importantly it gives Kiev an opportunity to occupy stronger positions during talks with Moscow on a whole range of issues -- on the status of the Russian language, oil and gas, and transit tariffs.

During its 15 years of independence, Ukraine has not felt as independent as during the last three years. This may be an illusion, but Russia is unable to dispel it for the time being. As a result, the closer Ukraine is to NATO, the fewer hopes Moscow has for Ukraine's active role in any Russian-led alliances like EurAsEC or a common economic space, not to mention a potential union of the two Slavic states.

Ukraine will join the West once and for all, and no matter how positive Russia's attitude to the West is, this will shut the doors to the common development of Russia and Ukraine. Russia should not take offense and should remember that its security interests do not wholly depend on Ukraine's NATO membership.

Russia and Ukraine also have economic and cultural interests, which should be promoted even in the worst circumstances.

(Alexander Karavayev works at the Center for CIS Studies at Moscow State University. A version of this piece was first published by RIA Novosti, but the opinions expressed in it are the author's alone.

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

Community
Email This Article
Comment On This Article

Related Links
Learn about the Superpowers of the 21st Century at SpaceWar.com
Learn about nuclear weapons doctrine and defense at SpaceWar.com