Last February the Russian Military-Industrial Commission headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov held a special session at the Moscow Research Institute of Precision Instrument-Making.

At first sight, it seems that the plans and legislative initiatives fully correspond with military-technical achievements. The latter include the development of the non-nuclear tactical Iskander missile -- NATO reporting name SS-26 -- for the Russian ground troops.

High survivability, a quick refilling system, a perfect data processing system, and a dual capability to carry both ballistic and cruise missiles allow Iskander to deal surgical strikes at small-size command and communication posts, and to destroy area targets, such as enemy troops. Proceeding from the results of tests, Russian military experts maintain that given active enemy resistance, Iskander is capable of hitting standard targets with one or two missiles, which is equivalent to the use of a nuclear warhead.

Under the program, the Russian ground forces will be equipped with such modern weapons. But this gives rise to some questions.

Last June Commander in Chief of the Russian Ground Forces four star General of the Army Alexander Maslov said that under the Arms Program until 2015 the Russian missile and artillery forces will receive five missile brigades, each equipped with the Iskander-M missiles -- NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone.

But why not six? The ground forces, which had nine combined arms armies and one army corps in 2004, are divided into six military districts. It would be logical for each district to have at least one brigade.

By the end of last year only the North Caucasus Military District received a missile brigade. Two years ago Maj.-Gen. Vladimir Zaritsky, head of Russia's artillery and missile forces, promised that in 2007 missile brigades in the Volga-Urals Military and Far Eastern Military Districts will receive Iskander-M systems.

For some reason, the introduction of these badly needed systems, developed by the Kolomenskoye Design Bureau of Machine-Building more than 10 years ago, has been going at a very slow pace. But the production of even such a small number of Iskanders at the current rate does not make sense because high-technology weapons quickly become obsolete, and these missiles may soon lose all of their advantages.

It transpires that now the program itself will be amended. Valery Voskoboinikov, deputy director of the Industry and Energy Ministry's Defense and Industrial Complex Department, reported in early February that a number of financial parameters will be specified in the course of the program's adjustment. It appeared that the program's cost is much higher than its budget parameters because of rising prices of materials and spare parts, and it is impossible to meet its goals both in the range and quantity of hardware.

This lack of foresight is simply amazing, considering that the program was endorsed quite recently -- at the end of 2006. This was a serious miscalculation, considering that Voskoboinikov had to make this statement just a year later.

Russian Defense Ministry planners have now made the unmistakable conclusion about the need to reduce the range or the quantity of military hardware. I have strong doubts that the reduction will affect the range -- modern Russian arms have been reliably hidden into the golden cage of export contracts. T-90 Main Battle Tanks in the Russian armed forces can be counted on the fingers of one hand. But 310 of these tanks have already been produced for India, and there are contractual commitments to supply it with another 347. The Iskander system is no exception. It has long been popular in the Middle East.

If the situation remains the same, our tanks will leave our tank-training grounds, and our surface aircraft will land on foreign ships. But in this case, the effectiveness of our own program of rearmament will be close to zero.

(Andrei Kislyakov is a political commentator for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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