The Russian General Staff has classified reform discussions in order to hide broad discontent among the top generals. It's also a good way to conceal possible poor reform planning and the lack of a clear national security strategy.

According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, on Nov. 11, 2008, Chief of General Staff Gen. Nikolai Makarov issued a secret directive entitled "On inadmissibility to disseminate information on Russian military reform." The order prohibits publicity on the reform progress, the arising problems and sentiments among the troops.

Officers who violate the proscription may be subject to criminal prosecution. The Defense Ministry news service denied the existence of such an order. However, the absence of relevant public discussion speaks to compliance with the "silent code."

The Russian military has much to be concerned about. On Oct. 14, 2008, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced yet another round of a fundamental military reform intended to redraw the Russian army's architectures within a year. This comes after years of reform efforts under Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, none of which delivered much bang for the buck.

The main elements of the current reform aim at restructuring and significantly reducing the army in size, as well as introducing elements of sound financial management. While most analysts agree on the need for such reforms to bring the Russian forces into the 21st century, many in the military oppose these changes.

The Soviet-era four-tier command structure (military district -- army -- division -- regiment) will transform into the modern three-tier chain of command used in many Western armies (military district -- operational command -- brigade). With this, naturally, some command-level positions will disappear, as well as some historically renowned army units and their symbols.

Under the new structure, Russia will reduce its military manpower by more than 300,000 troops in the first year. More than half of the officer corps will lose their jobs over three years, while many positions will become civilian. Officers are naturally concerned with the loss of benefits associated with their military status. Even those who can keep their jobs as civilians (for example, in finance and information departments) will lose in salary, housing and other benefits.

The Economist's analysis suggests that Russia neither needs nor can afford an army topping 1 million people. By various estimates, 600,000 to 700,000 at most would be a more appropriate number.

Serdyukov is a unique figure in the history of Russian military leadership. He is an economist and lawyer by education, and a furniture businessman and a former tax minister by trade. The son-in-law of former prime minister and current chairman of the Gazprom gas monopoly, Viktor Zubkov, he has a mandate from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev to clean up the army's corruption and poor financial practices.

Historically, the Russian military has lost millions of workdays every year when generals farmed out conscripts as cheap labor. According to the Russian Public Chamber Oversight Commission, one-third of the official military expenditure ($35.4 billion in 2007 -- in reality, possibly twice as much) ends up in corruption and embezzlement. Sound financial management will squeeze the illicit profits for many high ranks.

Russia's military fat cats do not like it when their access to cream is cut, nor do officers and gentlemen appreciate being tossed to the street in the middle of an economic crisis.

-- (Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at the Catherine and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation.)

Share This Article With Planet Earth

del.icio.us	Digg	Reddit
YahooMyWeb	Google	Facebook

Related Links
The Military Industrial Complex at SpaceWar.com
Learn about the Superpowers of the 21st Century at SpaceWar.com