It turns out that Russian electronic countermeasures systems are unable to jam and suppress enemy surface-to-air missiles and reconnaissance systems, radars and UHV communications and troop-control networks.

This is rather disturbing, especially as the Georgian army lacked modern systems. As a result, the 58th Army sustained unnecessary casualties and also lost more combat equipment than it should have.

The Russian tank force has been suffering from major problems for a long time. The North Caucasian Military District, for instance, still operates T-72 Main Battle Tanks without night sights. But not even the more sophisticated T-80-U and T-90 have such sights, either.

Moreover, their explosive-reactive armor was not filled with explosives and therefore could not deflect high-explosive anti-tank weapons.

It is common knowledge that tanks are extremely vulnerable in mountainous and urban areas and during redeployment because their crews lack all-round visibility, making it difficult to spot enemy soldiers with rocket launchers or shaped-charges hiding in caves and ravines and behind rocks and bushes.

The Dzerzhinsky Ural Railroad Car Works -- Uralvagonzavod -- which has developed all post-Soviet and Russian main battle tanks except the T-80, unveiled its Tank Support Combat Vehicle more than 20 years ago.

The TSCV featured nine weapons systems, including guided anti-tank missiles, large-caliber machine-guns, surface-to-air missiles and 30mm and 40mm automatic rocket launchers, and was intended to be used against Mujahedin forces in Afghanistan.

Most importantly, the TSCV had effective target-acquisition systems for detecting and killing enemy soldiers long before they could fire the first shot.

Although the TSCV has passed all state tests with flying colors and also has been displayed at numerous exhibitions, it has not served with the Russian army to date.

Unlike most advanced foreign armies, including the Israeli army, Russian tanks are not supported by attack helicopters. There is no regular radio communication between Russian tank, motorized-rifle, helicopter, attack-plane and tactical-bomber units either.

Although experts have been discussing the creation of an integrated combat-control system for many years, such a system remains on the drawing board.

The Russian army and its commanders have not yet realized that all units and weapons accomplishing a joint objective must become part of an integrated combat-control system.

Russian officers and soldiers have to compensate for the current lag in combat-support systems with their selfless heroism and bravery. But this costs the country and its armed forces dearly.

It is high time we learned modern fighting skills. The system for awarding state defense contracts must also be modified accordingly.

Unfortunately, the Russian army is unlikely to receive new weapons and combat-support systems after the South Ossetian conflict. Although Russia once again has paid a high price for victory, its generals and politicians often prefer empty talk to candid and sober-minded assessments.

(Nikita Petrov is a Russian military analyst. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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